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THE SINO-TAIWANESE CRISIS:
A GAME THEORETIC ANALYSIS

Nelson Chung

Abstract
Jllternational relations specialists ha1!e produced abllndallt litelllture on the CiJinaTaiwan crisis, which is among the most /io/atile issues .fu·ing the United States. But
thusfar, .tew halle predicted the olltcome o/t/Je crisis, which / intend to do. / use game
theOl:y to model the expected behal'ior o/the three countries while considering each

0/

the other;- actiOlzs. JOI',,"!/lllize the outcomes based Oil the four major regime-type re/atiollShip optiolls fwailable to China alld Taiwan: reTI 11 ijiCtltio II, cOlzteriellltioll, commOllwefllth, alld illrlepmdmce. By bllildillg

Oil

preuiolls research, / define the illcefl-

tiue structures the three co II II tries .flce. \,(/ithin thatjTaml'work / examine I'llery possible
coune

0/ actiOiI accessible to each col/lltry and how each course ofactio II afficts their

payoffs. Then lfind the Nash-EquilibriulIl

COllrse

o/fletion. / predict that China and

Taiu1an luill peacefitl(y ,liJrlll a commOllll'ealth, because neither side call find a more
profitable lmilateml deviation.

Introduction .

I

n his reelection bid President George W. Bush said the following

In

defense of invading Iraq:
We're pursuing a strategy of freedom around the world, because I understand free nations will reject terror. Free nations
will answer the hopes and aspirations of their people. Free nations will help us achieve the peace we all want. (New York
Times, 1 October 2()04)

President Bush's remarks reflect his neoconservative belief in promoting peace through spreading democracy, a conviction which stems
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from the theory that democratic nations will avoid gomg to war with
each other.
Bush exhibited this ideology early in his tenure when he vowed to
commit whatever resources necessary to defend democratic Taiwan in the
case that China decided to attack. His promise is perhaps the strongest
commitment by a
president to Taiwan since the
de-recognized
Taiwan's status as a sovereign state. The commitment constitutes a radical
break from previous administrations' intentional ambiguity toward the
China-Taiwan problem. Critics condemned Bush's act ;s excessively
provocative, contending that China's staunch determination to regain the
island could produce a major conflict if the U.S. intervened. Supporters
lauded the President's commitment to defending democracy.
The China-Taiwan problem originated when China ceded Taiwan

u.s.

u.s.

to the Japanese in 1895. After World War II, the Japanese were forced to

relinquish Taiwan to the United States, who transferred the island to the
Chinese Nationalists as a place of refuge against the Communists in
the Chinese Civil War. The Nationalists lost the war and retreated to
Taiwan. Ever since, Taiwan has functioned as a de facto independent
country. The Civil War has been declared over, but China is insistent on
regaining Taiwan and has threatened the use of force in doing so.
Any military conflict in the Taiwan Strait would cost the U.S., China,
and Taiwan in lives and treasure. Each country is considering the relevant
costs, which thus far have prevented them from taking any action. Using a
game-theoretic model of Taiwan, China, and the United States, I predict
that China and Taiwan will peacefully form a Chinese commonwealth, the
U.S. will not have to intervene, and China will nor impose economic sanctions. This outcome follows from several conclusions. If Taiwan attempts
to gain more sovereignty than that granted by a commonwealth by declaring independence, it would incur a costly Chinese invasion without American help. For China, if Taiwan offers to form a commonwealth, invading
would be too costly; Beijing is better off simply accepting that political relationship. If Beijing threatens to isolate Taiwan economically, it would see
damage to its own economy; therefore such threats are not credible.
Past Work on the Sino-Taiwanese Conflict

Many international relations scholars have written about the probability and impact of a Taiwanese declaration of independence and a
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Chinese invasion. Steven Tsang has examined the incentive structures the
two states face in their actions (Tsang 2004b). I will use these structures
to gauge the payoffs of different strategy options.
Scholars differ on whether China would follow through on any threat
to attack Taiwan. Michael O'Hanlon advances notions that China would
not invade because (1) it has too much to lose economically and (2) it lacks
the military capacity (O'Hanlon 2000). Andrew Scobell and Larry Wortzell
challenge those notions, arguing that China would retake Taiwan even at
high economic costs. And though China lacks the navy to launch an amphibious attack, it possesses missiles and weapons of mass destruction sufficient to obliterate the island (Scobell and Wortzell 2001). This aids in
determining the payotfs of the game; China would lose more from not
invading than from invading if Taiwan chooses to declare independence.
Concerning the Taiwanese side, John Tkacik argues that Taiwan has
too much invested in China to declare independence (Tkacik 2001). Even
if China does not attack, it can threaten to sever economic relations with
Taiwan at high costs to the latter.
Regarding the outcome of a possible armed conflict, Ellis Joffe shows
that three major options of attacking Taiwan are available to China:
a blockade, missile strikes, and an amphibious invasion (Joffe 2OCH,
126-27). Assuming U.S. support of Taiwan, only missile strikes have a
reasonable probability of succeeding Sustaining a blockade against Taiwan is difficult against the Taiwanese military, let alone the U.S. military.
An amphibious invasion is beyond the capacity of the Chinese military in
the near future. From this premise it is clear that U.S. intervention would
probably determine whether China can take back Taiwan.
Scholars recognize that cross-strait dynamics also hear significance to
the United States. Ralph Clough has noted a trend of Taiwanese information technology (IT) production facilities being relocated to the Chinese
mainland. Many of these final products are sold in the U.S. (Clough
2001, .)3). Any military conflict would potentially atfect the supply of
these technologies to U.S. markets. This technology factor increases the
costs of non-intervention for the United States.
On the theoretical level, Enze Han, Emerson Niou, and Brett Benson
have each used game theory to model the Sino-Taiwanese crisis. Han
provides a very basic model as a starting point (Han 2004). The model
includes two games with two players each, China and Taiwan: one game
SIGMA
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without American intervention, one with American intervention. The second game has a higher probability of conflict. Han proposes increasing the
incentives for cooperation in order to avoid that conflict. In these games,
players are given two options: cooperate, which means maintaining the
status quo, and deviate, which to Taiwan means independence and to
China attacking. Han's model shows that a U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan would actually heighten the probability of war (Han 2004,
8-9). He recommends increasing incentives for cooperation ~s the way to
maintain peace.
Niou's more sophisticated model of the crisis includes the U.S. as a
third player and uses sequential moves, dividing China's military action
into two steps: missile exercises and actual attacks. It also includes the uncertainty of who is in charge of each country. His conclusions include,
among others, that Taiwan is more likely to declare independence if the
probability of U.S. help is high and that China is more likely to use military coercion if the American government is weak (Niou 1998, 12, 18).
Benson and Niou construct another game-theoretic model that accounts for the different types and levels of commitments the U.S. can
make to Taiwan (Benson and Niou 2001; 2004). In their game, the U.S.
chooses among ambiguous, weak, and strong commitments. Niou and
Benson conclude that the U.S. can maximize its payoff by maintaining
ambiguity in its commitment to defend Taiwan.
The aforementioned models allow us to see the significance of U.S. involvement, the importance of each country's leadership strength, and the
implications of diHerent degrees of clarity in U.S. commitments. But each
model has dichotomous strategies: Taiwan can choose either between reunification, on one hand, and independence or the status quo, on the
other. These models ignore the possibility of different regime types that
can serve as compromises between the two outcomes. They also disregard
the impossibility of Taiwan's maintaining the status quo. Joffe notes that
China has sternly warned Taiwan that it does not have the option of maintaining the status quo forever (2001, 111). Scholars have proposed diHerent regime types that do allow for compromises in the political relationship
between China and Taiwan. A confederacy and a commonwealth are two
of the most common of these models. Tai-chun Kuo and Ramon H. Myers
have defined a commonwealth (Kuo and Myers 2004, 192-94); Tsang, a
confederacy (Tsang 2004a, 202-06).
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Under a commonwealth, two equal and sovereign countries join in a
political union. They control standing territories and pledge not to intervene in each other's domestic affairs. Neither is considered a province. A
commonwealth between China and Taiwan would allow Taiwan to become a neutral country in security terms and require the two countries to
gradually demilitarize. Additionally, a commonwealth allows each country
to

engage in its own diplomatic relations and join international organiza-

tions. According to Kuo and Myers, this arrangement, a commonwealth,
would help China "expunge the past humiliations suffered by the PRC
from foreign 'imperialism' and allow the people of Taiwan recognition as
a sovereign, independent nation" (Kuo and Myers 2004, 192).
A confederacy constitutes a slightly closer integration. Tsang describes
a confederacy (what he dubs as a "Chinese Union") as
two governmenrs across the Taiwan Strait upholding the principle that there is but one China though both can have diplomatic representations overseas and conduct rclations with the
rest of the world without violating this principle. In looking at
the sovereignry issue this can be seen in comparison to that in
a marriage. While a married couple (or the Chinese Union) together will share 'sovereignty' as a unit. the husband and the
wife (or the two constituent Chinese state, of the PRC and
Taiwan) can by mlltual agreement and understanding still
function as 'sovereign' individuals to the outside world without
infringing on the 'sovereignty' of the marriage (or the Chinese
Union) even though one partner in the marriage (or the PRC)
may. because of its size. playa more dominant role. (Tsang
2004a, 20.1)

In comparison to a commonwealth, which grants Taiwan full sovereignty,
a confederacy allows Taiwan shared sovereignty with China while ftmctioning as a sovereign only in diplomatic relations. In a confederacy, unlike in a commonwealth, Taiwan must conduct its diplomatic relations
under a tide that designates itself as part of the Chinese confederacy, such
as "Taiwan of the Chinese Union" or "Chinese Taiwan" (Tsang 2004a,
204). In addition, Taiwan can never vote against or undermine China in
international bodies. As in a commonwealth, a confederacy prohibits interference in each other's domestic affairs, but adds that the two entities
cannot criticize each other's policies. Also like a commonwealth, a confederacy allows both sides to maintain their own armed forces with separate
SICMA
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command structures and the right to purchases arms from any source in
the world. But the two militaries would organize under the designation
"Defence Forces of the Chinese Union," with a coordinating body (Tsang
2004a, 205). As is apparent, a confederacy implies a tighter union in name
and in function vis-a.-vis a commonwealth.
I use those definitions to construct a sequential-move, game-theoretic
model that assumes Taiwan has reached the point where it must choose
from reunification, confederacy, commonwealth, and independence. Past
game-theoretic models have included the status quo as an oi)tion because
the aims of those models were normative: to determine what the U.S.
should do to avoid armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait. These models did
not predict the final outcome of the crisis. In constrast, this study does.
The status quo cannot be the final outcome because China has said it
will not allow Taiwan to drag its feet indefinitely. This model assumes
that Taiwan has reached a point where it must choose, that China reacts
to Taiwan's decision, and that the U.S. decides whether to intervene.
This study adds further light to the crisis by allowing us to see what
regime type will define the Sino-Taiwanese political relationship.
Unit of Analysis
I will treat Taiwan, China, and the United States as unitary actors for
simplification.' Rational choice theory allows the aggregation of each
policymaker's decision calculus into a whole, assuming that each politician
within a country faces roughly the same incentive structure. 2
The Taiwanese Interest
With the players defined, I now identify the interests of each player
that constitute the payoffs in the game. The government of Taiwan seeks
to perpetuate its power, and to do so the government must answer to its
electorate. Su identified democratization as the greatest force behind
Taiwan's mainland policy (Su 2004, 50-51). Blit the realities of the international system restrain Taiwan from acting Ollt of pure political motives
at the expense of the country's security. In face of these limitations, Taiwan can respond to the demands of its people by pursuing three major
goals: raising Taiwan's international standing, maintaining the democratic
way oflife, and promoting economic prosperity.
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Raising uzizUtms Illternatiowzl Standing. The Taiwanese generally desire raising Taiwan's international profile. Disagreement over the island's
identity and future polarizes its inhabitants. But a majority rejects the "one
China" principle and recognizes Taiwan's sovereignty (Zhao 2001, 103).
Taiwan actively seeks to promote its sovereignty through dispensing foreign aid in exchange for diplomatic relations, campaigning to join international organizations, and demanding equality in talks with the PRe.
Attain ing de jure independence would consummate Taiwan's quest for a
heightened international standing.
Maintaining the Democratic Way of Lift. Democratization has raised
Taiwan's international profile, but the Taiwanese also hold liberal democracy to be an end unto itself, not just a means to attain stronger international status. Tsang has noted that the Taiwanese see themselves as
sharing more in terms of political values with Western Europe and North
America than with communist China (Tsang 2004b, G). Taiwan has experienced the freedoms of liberal democracy and would not revert to
authoritarianism. De jure independence would ensure that the Taiwanese
continue to enjoy their freedoms. Reunification would not necessarily
mean that those freedoms would be revoked; China has promised not to
interfere with local affairs after reunification (Lasater 2000a, 48). But the
Taiwanese are suspicious of those promises. They scrutinize China's treatment of Hong Kong in order to predict the treatment China would give
them under unification.
Promoting Economic Prosperity. Even more so than democratization,
rapid economic growth in Taiwan has enhanced Taiwan's prestige and improved the quality of life for the Taiwanese. To take advantage of China's
economic ascent will require Taiwan to have closer economic integration
with China.
In pursuing increased international standing, perpetuation of democracy, and fmt-her economic growth, Taiwan is subject to constraints imposed by the PRe. Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on the
mainland make it vulnerable to blackmail. Pursuing international recognition angers the PRC and has often elicited threats of attack.
China has the world's fastest-growing economy, and Taiwan must
concede to closer integration if she is to cash in on that growth. China
supplies a huge export market and low-cost labor. Consequently,
Taiwanese companies have relocated much of their manufacturing to the
SIGMA
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mainland. In order to capture further gains from this growth, Taiwanese
businesses have lobbied the Chen adminisrration to proceed with simtollg,
or "three links" of direct air, shipping, and mail across the strait. Industrialists like Wang Yung-Ching of Formosa Plastics and Kao Chin-yen of
Uni-Enterprises (owner of the 7-Eleven franchise in Taiwan) have joined
in lobbying, suggesting that Taiwan's government set aside politics for fifty
years and focus on economic issues (Trliwllll Economic News, 22 May
2002). Jiang Zemin expresses similar wishes. His eight-point proposal
asserts that "political disagreement should not impede econa'mic cooperation" between China and Taiwan; Jiang aims to protect the "rights and
interests of industrialists and business people from Taiwan" (Jiang 1995).
Detaching politics from economics is impossible (Rourke 1995, 472).
Wang, Kao, and Jiang are naive in thinking that it is.
While the growing trade and investmenr relationship between China
and Taiwan is mutually beneficial, Taiwan, as the smaller economy, stands
to lose more if the relationship is ended. China can threaten to sever economic ties if Taiwan refuses to reunite. Chalmers Johnson has noted that
the Taiwanese government is aware of this, and in response it has tried to
divert outward foreign investmenr flows from China towards Southeast
Asia to lessen dependence on China's market, so that an attack on Taiwan
equates to an attack on the entire region (Johnson 2000, 160). Nonetheless, if links are not established, Taiwan may lose out to Japanese, Korean,
and Western corporations in cashing in on China's boom. Thus the
"China factor" imposes a major constraint on Taiwan in promoting economic prosperity.
Taiwanese pursuit of international recognition provokes China. Chinese economic and military threats constrain Taiwan's ambitions to improve its international profile. Examples of responses to Taiwan's eHorts at
acquiring international recognition include the firing of missiles into the
Strait after Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University
in 1996 and the Chinese furor over arms purchases from the United States.

The Chinese Interest
Just as Taiwan must answer to its electorate in order to perpetuate its
power, China is beholden to the nationalism that legitimizes the regime.
With Communism's collapse the CCP resorted to nationalism as the
ideology bolstering the party. The CCp's legitimacy is a function of its

118 SIGMA

•
CHUNC;

performance in boosting the state's international stature and meeting the
basic needs of its people. China can do so in three major ways: maintaining territorial integrity to meet the irredentist demands of its people,
improving its strategic position to increase its power and thereby enhance
international stature and prestige, and developing China's economy to improve the lives of its people. All three are answers to nationalism; the last
can also be seen as meeting the basic needs of its people. The following is
a detailed explanation of the three.
1. Closing the chapter o/national humiliation. The CCP is determined
to retake Taiwan in order to close the chapter of national humiliation
caused by Western and Japanese imperialists, as that would end what
China sees as foreign meddling in China's domestic affairs. Allowing
Taiwan to break away would dissatisfy its people's nationalistic sentiments
because Taiwan has not been fully returned to China since China surrendered the island to Japan in 1895. If Taiwan were allowed to become independent, the CCP would be seen as incapable of answering to the
nationalism that legitimizes it in the first place. Social disorder might
result from CCP indifference to Taiwanese moves toward independence.
Such is the main incentive for the PRC to block independence movements. Thus, having Taiwan under its reins would positively impact
China's legitimacy, as did the return of Hong Kong.
2. Enhallcing national power. In addition to closing the chapter of
humiliation, China can answer to the nationalism of its people by attaining
superpower status. Retaking Taiwan would boost the PRe's strategic position and hard power. Martin L. Lasater has noted that control of Taiwan
would give China the following: its only strategic gateway into the ocean;
adjacency to critical sea lines of communication; the ability to block Japan's
economic lifeline; a communications hub in the Western PacifIC; disruption
of the U.S. strategic chain spanning Japan, Korea, and the Philippines; and
the coastal defense currently unavailable (Lasater 2000a, 7-8).
But the costs of war would cripple China's military, especially if the
U.S. chose to intervene. As will be discussed later, war could mean economic instability leading to social unrest that would force the PLA to
protect the CCP and render the PLA incapable of attending to its security
functions. The geopolitical enhancement from having Taiwan would be of
little use if the PLA has to quell domestic discontent. Thus I expect war
to have a negative impact on China's national power.
SIGMA
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3. Developing economy. China's rapid post-liberalization growth has
contributed immensely in legitimizing the CCP. Integrating newly industrialized Taiwan into China's economic sphere would further the work by
enabling a synergistic relationship between China's low-cost labor and Taiwan's advanced high-tech sector. However, as was seen with the European
Union in its earlier stages, complete economic integration does not require
political integration. Tariff-free borders, free flow of investment, and labor
mobility can occur between two independent political entities. On the
other hand, attacking Taiwan comes at a high economic costs-; Scobel! and
Wortzel! have shown that an invasion of Taiwan would lead to a sharp
drop in foreign direct investment inflows from Taiwan to the mainland
and thereby would cause massive unemployment and ultimately social unrest (Scobell and Wortzell 200 I, 1). Retaking Taiwan by force would hurt
China's economy and the CCP's legitimacy, so it constitutes a major disincentive for forced reunification.
International constraints on Chi1lfl. In pursuing legitimacy through
those three means, China faces the constraints of the international system.
China has entered the international community and consequently is subject to global norms and institutions. Two major events constrain China
in its attempts to maximize legitimacy: the probability of international
intervention and the disapproval of the international community.
Expected international intervention. The international community is
likely to frown upon an invasion and may take action to deter China.
China saw NATO intervene in Kosovo without a UN mandate and in
spite of NATO's recognition of Serbia's sovereignty. This action has major
implications for the Taiwan issue because China's UN Security Council
veto and Taiwan's lack of sovereignty may not be enough to safeguard
China from international intervention.
International norms. In addition, forcibly reintegrating Taiwan would
adversely affect China's "soft power." As Joseph Nye has demonstrated, the
ability to get others to do things through enticement rivals hard power
as the "currency" of international relations today (Nye 2004). Much talk
of the recent diminution of the U.S.'s soft power resulted from Bush's
allowing the neoconservatives to run amok in foreign policy decisionmaking (Buchanan 2004; Prestowitz 2003). Neoconservatives in the
upper reaches of the Bush administration have been blamed for violating
international norms when attacking Iraq unprovoked and for considering
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doing the same to Iran. The same wOllld hold true for China. Attacking
a prosperous, democratic entity would similarly give China a black eye in
the international community. Furthermore, such a choice could even
lead to a Cold War with the United States (Scobell and Wortzell 2001,
20-21). Thus, invading Taiwan clearly harms China's international status.
U.S. Interest
U.S. interests 1Il the cross-strait crisis are mainly strategic and economic. Lasater identified nine reasons why Taiwan is of importance to the
United States and five why China is (Lasater 2000b, 51-56). I summarize
the major issues below.
strategic interests in 7fiiwlln. Taiwan is of strategic importance to
the United States for three major reasons. First, if the U.S. bils to defend
Taiwan it will hurt U.S. credibility regarding its other commitments.' Second, a de facto divided China may be vital ill containing China's growing
power. Third, Taiwan is part of an American ally chain that spans Japan,
South Korea, and the Philippines. If a war were to break out, escalate, and
spread, the U.S. would be drawn in, if only to fulfill its commitment to
protect its allies.
US. economic illtt'l'ests ill Ttliwall. Taiwan is the U.S.'s seventh-largest
trade partner and, as mentioned before, a large supplier of the U.S.'s IT
consumption. A war would cause both an IT shortage in the U.S. and a
recession that would spread throughout the Asia-Pacific region, the destination for the bulk of U.S. exports, limiting the region's ability to absorb
them.

us.

us.

strategic interests in China. The U.S. has strategic interests in
China as well. With China's growing power the U.S. needs to accommodate China in the new world order. China has the potential to join the
U.S. in the global war on terror and in nonproliferation. Coming to Taiwan's defense may complicate China's willingness to help 011 those fronts.
Furthermore, the war will likely escalate into a regional security conflict
between the U.S. and China.

US. economic interests ill C'hina. The U.S. has a large stake in China's
economic development. Cheap imports from China have helped save
American consumers $100 billion since 1997. China is also an eager consumer of American goods. As America's fastest-growing export market,
China absorbs $20 billion worth of American exports each year. China
SIGMA
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also helps keep U.S. interest rates low by financing U.S debt (Tyson 2003,
30). It is in the U.S.'s interest to maintain its economic relationship with
China without disruption from war.

Model Specification
Within the above framework, I use game theory to predict the outcome of the China--Taiwan problem. Taiwan, China, and the U.S. will he
the players in the game. They will move in that order. Taiwan:s strategy set
(s7) contains four strategies: reunification (r), confederacy (ef), commonwealth (ew), and independence (idp). China's strategy set (SC) contains three strategies: invade (nu), not-invade but impose sanctions
(-lll'lse), not-invade and not impose sanctions (-lIu1-sc). The U.S.'s strategy set (SA) contains three strategies: intervene to help Taiwan (Il) and not
intervene (_h).4 I sllmmarize the strategy sets of all three players:
(I)

ST
SC
.<,A

=

(T, cj cw, idp)
(lIU, -mise, -nul-sc)

=

Ill,

=

-hi

Taiwan, as the first mover, chooses between r, ~l cw, and idp. I assume
that if it chooses r, it does so on Chinese terms, in accordance with Jiang
Zemin's eight-point proposal, which allows Taiwan to retain its armed
forces and independently administer its governmental affairs (Jiang 1995).
China will have attained its goal of peaceful unification and the game will
be over. If Taiwan chooses (j,' cw, or idp, then China chooses among IlU,
-llulsc, and -mi-sc. If China chooses lUi, then the U.S. enters the game
and chooses between hand - h.
The following is a list of all possible outcomes. The first letter of each
outcome denotes Taiwan's strategy: R for reunitlcation, F for confederacy,
W for commonwealth, and 1 for independence. for the number that follows the letter, -1 denotes a Chinese invasion and U.S. aid to Taiwan, -2 a
Chinese invasion without U.S. aid to Taiwan, -3 Chinese sanctions, and
-4 Chinese acceptance of Taiwan's offer. If Taiwan chooses reunification,
the game automatically ends without participation by the other players.
Therefore I set the digit for reunification to zero because 1-4 are irrelevant.
(2)
RO: (r)
FI: (cj lUi, h)
f2: (4' lUi, -h)

F3: (cj - tlulse)
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F4: (if,

~nv/~sc)

\'(/1: (cU!,

111J,

\'(/2: (cw,

lllJ,

W3: (cw,

~

h)
~/;)

IW!'C)

\'(/4: (au, ~llvl ~s()

11: (idp,
12: (idp,

lW, /;)

13: (idp,
14: (idp,

~ llvlse)

lllJ,

~ h)

~nll/~se)

I also assume that for every U.S. lIoll-IJe!p outcome, China will eventually
win the war, and Taiwan will be forced into reunification. For every h outcome, Taiwan will survive the war and strained relations after the
war will prevent any union between China and Taiwan, regardless of what
Taiwan originally offered, and Tliwan will be independent. The same applies if China imposes economic sanctions: strained relations will render
compromises impossible, and Taiwan will become independent. I summarize the ass lim ptions of the model below:
1. Taiwan has reached the point where it must choose
between reunification, confederacy, commonwealth, and
independence. Although Taiwan is currently able to keep
its policy options open rather than being forced to
choose one (Nathan and Ross 1997, 213-14), China has
warned that Taiwan cannot maintain the status quo indefinitely (Joffe 2001, 11 I).
2. If Taiwan reunites, China, though authoritarian, will
treat Taiwan in accordance with Jiang Zemin's eight
points for peaceful reunification.
3. If the U.S. does not intervene, China will win the war
and force Taiwan into reunification.
4. If the U.S. intervenes, Taiwan will survive the war and
become independent.
5. If China decides to impose economic sanctions on
Taiwan, compromise would be impossible and Taiwan
would move to independence regardless of what it initially offered.
SIGMA 123
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Analysis of Preferences
Ttliwan's Preftrences

I now examine every outcome and the utility each player derives from
those outcomes. To begin, I group similar outcomes and compare. Because for every non-help outcome Taiwan will be forced into reunification
and thereby lose all international standing in addition to suffering economic damage, all -2 outcomes will yield the lowest payoffs. From this
I conclude that
(3)
F2= W2=12.
And because with all help outcomes, Taiwan will become independent
and thereby maximize its international standing, its democratic way of
life, and suffer economic damages to a smaller degree than with non-help
outcomes, all help outcomes will yield payoffs all equal to each other and
higher than those in (3). This is represented by
(4)
F1=Wl=ll>F2=W2=12.
If Taiwan were to choose reunification then it would lose all international standing, puts its democratic way of life at risk, but could continue to enjoy economic prosperity. It would yield a payoff lower than
outcomes with help but higher than lion-help. With reunification, international standing approaches zero, while with all help economic prosperity does not close in on zero. Hence,
(5)
11> RO>F2.
For all non-invade/sanction, Taiwan would suffer economic isolation
from the mainland, although it could find alternative sources of economic
prosperity. Economic isolation does not compare to economic destruction
from war. So all payoff values for non-invadelstmction scenarios are higher
than those for all invade scenarios. And because the sixth assumption
holds that if sanctions are imposed, Taiwan move towards independence,
regardless of what it originally offered, all non-inV{ldeisanction outcomes
yield the same payoff values. Thus non-ill/!tlde/Stllictiolt payoffs are all equal
and greater than invade payoffs: Thus,
(6)
F3=W3=LhFl=Wl=11.
For all cases of non-illvtldeinoll-stillction, Taiwan could enjoy greater
international standing and continued economic prosperity than with JlOIlill/!tlde/stlllctioll cases. The level of international standing differs according
to regime type. Hence,
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(7)
(8)

14> V14>f4>F3= W~J=13.
Ifwe aggregate (4) through (7), we have
14> V14>F4>F3= W3=13>F1 = V1I =1i>RO>F2= V12=12.

China:, Preferences

Again, I begin by grouping similar outcomes. For all non-help outcomes, China would have Taiwan under its control after a long war, but
would suffer economic losses from war and suffer backlash from the international community for attacking a free-market democracy. The damage to
its military would offset any geostrategic enhancement from gaining the
island. The backlash would be [he only variable that differs depending on
what Taiwan chooses and would be inversely related to the level of autonomy Taiwan is seeking. If Taiwan were to choose independence, for example,
the backlash over attacking Taiwan would not be as great as if Taiwan offered com mOl/wealth, because offering commonwealth would make Taiwan
seem more conciliatory, since it is partially relinquishing some sovereignty,
so China would seem more at fault ifit declined the offer and attacked. Offering conJCderacy would make Taiwan seem ewn more conciliatory and
China even more at fault if China declined. So we have the following:
(9)
12> V12>F2.
For all help outcomes, China would not be able to regain Taiwan and
close the chapter of national humiliation. U.S. intervention would allow
Taiwan to become an independent country regardless of what Taiwan
chose in the first place. The payoffs are thus lower than in all those in (10)
and also depend on whether Taiwan were to choose conJCderacy, commOl/we,lItI}, or independence. So again, as with non-help outcomes, all variables
would be the same irrespective of Taiwan's original strategy, except the
international backlash, which would differ depending on in how conciliatorilya manner Taiwan negotiates:
(10)
12>V12>F2>Ii>V1i>FI.
If Taiwan were to choose conJCderacy, or commonwealth, and China
were to enact economic sanctions, then China would suffer the same economic damages from severing economic ties with Taiwan. Its closing of
the chapter of national humiliation would be the same under both outcomes because in both cases Taiwan would move towards independence,
regardless of whether it offered confederacy or commonwealth (Assumption 5). Still, the payoffs would be higher than from any war scenario:
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(11)

F3= W3>I2.
If Taiwan were to choose independence and China were to choose noninvilde/sallction, that is, do nothing, the CCP would lose its legitimacy,
creating the worst-case scenario. If Taiwan were to choose independence
and China non-invade/sI1l1ction, i.e., merely sanction, such action would
amount to virtual inaction. China would lose almost as much legitimacy,
creating the next-to-worst-case scenario, which would be worse than losing a war to the United States.
Some may question this preference. Assumption 4 holds that if the
u.S. were to choose help then China loses the war and not regain Taiwan
anyway. China would apparently suffer severe geopolitical and economic
damage in vain. The reason, as Chu Shulong of the China Institute of
Contemporary International Relations explains, owes to cultural perceptions of victory. Chu says that even if China were to lose to the United
States, standing up against an encroaching superpower like the U.S. would
be considered victorious to the Chinese (Chu1997). Thus the people prefcr China fight and lose the war than do nothing at all.
(12)
Fl>J3>I4.
If Taiwan were to choose commonwealth or cOllftdcrtlcy, and China
were to choose non-invfldeillon-sanction, then China would somewhat
close the chapter of national humiliation, without suffering losses in
economic development from severing economic ties with Taiwan. The
more autonomy Taiwan gains, the more embarrassment China suffers. All
non-in l!tlde/ll 0 II-sail ctioll scenarios yield greater payoff values than all lloninvade/sanction scenarios because the only difference is that lIon-invade/
sanction allows China to maintain trade and investment relations with
Taiwan.
(13)
F4> W4>Fh W3.
Finally, if Taiwan were to choose reunification, the chapter of national
humiliation would be completely closed, there would be no international
backlash, and China's national power would be strcngthened. This would
be the best-case scenario:
(14)
RO>r4.
Comhining (10) through (14) gives us the following preferences for

China:
(15)
RO>F4> W4>F3= W3>J2> il7.2>F2>Jl> Wi> Fi>l3>J4.
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United States' Preferences
We now examine preferences for the third mover, the United States. As
stated earlier, if the U.s. were to fail to come to Taiwan's aid it would lose
credibility on its defense commitments elsewhere. The U.S. has pledged its
support for all scenarios excepting a unilateral Taiwanese declaration of
independence. As mentioned earlier, the current Bush administration opposes any unilateral acts towards independence. It the U.S. intervenes when
Taiwan chooses independence it loses lives and treasure and suffers strained
relations with China; good relations are needed in the war on terror. So by
choosing 1Ion-help the U.s. would lose credibility only if Taiwan chooses
confedemq or commonwealth, not if Taiwan chooses independence. With FI
and WI the benefits of maintaining credibility and of maintaining China's
and Taiwan's separation from each other would exceed the cost of strained
relations with China. Between its non-help options, the U.s. prefers Taiwan
choosing conftderaq over cormnonloealth. The U.s. loses more credibility
from non-help if Taiwan offered c01lftderaq, because with cor~federacy Taiwan sacrifices more sovereignty. making it seem more conciliatory. Thus
the U.S. would be more obligated to defend Taiwan. Conversely. help when
Taiwan chooses cOllf:derrl~Y would be better than non-help if Taiwan
chooses commonwealth for the same reason. When Taiwan is more conciliatory. the obligation to defend is greater, and thus the higher the costs of
not defending.
To summarize, if Taiwan chooses conftdemqor commonwealth, then the
U.S. would be better off choosing JJelp. And the u.s. is better off helping
when Taiwan chooses conftdemcy than helping if it chooses commollwealtlr.
(16)
Fl>Wl>W2>F2.
But if Taiwan chooses independence, then the U.S. is better off choosing non-help. But 12 is preferred to W2 and F2 because again, the U.S. has
a greater obligation to intervene the more conciliatory Taiwan is. However, FI and- W'I are preferred to 12 because it is in the U.S.'s security interest to keep the two entities separate, and if Taiwan is seen as conciliatory the U.S. has justification. Finally, II is preferred to W2 and F2
because though the United States has no obligation to intervene if Taiwan
declares independence. intervening when not obligated and keeping Taiwan separate would be better than not intervening when obligated and
seeing a rise in Chinese power.
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Fl> Wl>I2>Il> W2>F2.
Beyond this point, payoff values are irrelevant for the United States
because for reunification and all nOll-invade scenarios the U.S. does not
play in the game. But I will complete the assignment of payoff values so
we can see the U.S. 's final utility. If Taiwan were to choose reunification,
then the U.S. would be better off than in any war scenario. Although the
U.S. would rather the two nations remain separate to contain the rise of
Chinese hegemony, the U.S. has demonstrated its preference tor a peaceful resolution in its longstanding policy of allowing the two sides to work
things out themselves. Thus,
(18)
RO>Fl.
The U.s. would also rather China and Taiwan bilaterally reunite than
China impose economic sanctions on Taiwan. Sanctions would cause a
regional economic disruption and cause U.S. exports to fall sharply. In
others words, though the U.S. would be better off geopolitically with n01/invade/sallction outcomes than with reunification, economically reunification would be more beneficial. Neither geopolitics nor economics are independent from each other, bur in this case I expect economic concerns to
dominate for two reasons.
(17)

First, a sharp export decline would cause the already-massive U.S.
trade deficit to swell to unacceptable proportions, considerably harming
the U.S.'s financial position. Second, the U.s. is currently devising other
solutions to containing China's hegemonic rise. The most notable one is
mai ntaining the balance of power in the region through strengthening
Japan by seeking a permanent seat in U.N. Security Council for the
island-nation. So though China would be strengthened by reunification,
its power can be offset by a more powerful Japan. For this reason the economic advantages of reunification would outweigh its political disadvantages. Thus reunification would yield higher payoff values for the United
States than non-invade/sanction scenarios.
Among the non-invadelstmction outcomes, all yield the same payoff
values because Assumption ') holds that in the case of sanctions Taiwan
will move towards independence regardless of what it originally offered.
The non-illvade/sa1lction scenarios would also be preferable to any war
scenarios, because the United States prt:fers any peaceful solution over
armed conflict. With war the regional economic disruption is even greater
than with sanctions. To summarize,
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(19)

RO>F3= W.3=LhFI.
Finally, non-illVlldelnoll-sanction scenarios are optimal for the United
States. They are peaceful solutions that keep the two entities separate
to certain degrees. Among those solutions, greater separation between
Taiwan and China results in a lower threat of Chinese hegemony and thus
greater payoffs for the U.s. So we have
(20)
[4> W4>F4>RO.
Combining (15) through (20) yields:
(21)

[4> W4>f4>[W>f3= W3=lhFl> Wl> [2> [l> W2>F2.

I n Table 1, I assign ordinal payoff values to outcomes for each player.

Outcome

Taiwan

China

U.S.

RO

2

12

8

FI

3

3

6

F2

1

6

1

F3

4

9

7

F4

5

11

9

WI

3

4

5

W2

1

7

2

W3

4

9

7

W4

6

10

10

lJ

3

5

3

12

1

8

4

13

4

2

7

14

7

1

11

Table 1: Payoff Values for Each Player
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Towards a Nash-Equilibrium Solution
With the ordinal values in place I now proceed to construct the extensive form game, shown in Figure 1. I will solve the Nash-equilibrium by
backwards induction.
Taiwan

r

cf

(2,12,8)

China

Ill!

~ Illifsc

~ n1l1 ~ sc

(4,9.1)

(5,11,9)

China

China

/lvlsc

~ nul~ sc

(4,9.1)

(6, 10,10)

/\ -h
(I ,6, I)

Legend
r - reunifIcation
Lf- confederacy
cw - commonwealth

h

/\

(3,4.5)

Ill'

~

fIlIlsc

(4,

l,~)

~ Iwl ~ sc

e, I, II)

us

us

h

(3,3,6)

idp

~

Nil

us

CIU

~j,

(I],2)

j,

A

(3,5.3)

~h

(1,8.4)

Ill' - invade
sc - sanction

h - help 1:1iwan

Figure 1: Extensive Form Game

Third-Mover: US.
If the U.S. is given (Lf !w), it chooses h. If given (ClV, llu), it chooses
h, If given (idp, IW), it chooses ~!J. So we eliminate F2, W2, and! I from
the game.

Second Mouer: China
If given (cf), China chooses ~Ill'/~SC. If given (ClU), China chooses
~nv/~sc. If given (idp), China chooses nv. This allows us to eliminate FI,
f3, WI, W3, 12, 13 and 14 from the game.
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First Mouer: 7iziwtl11
Taiwan, as the first mover, chooses from the entire ST and chooses cu',
which yields (cw, - nul, or W4, which has the highest remaining payoff
value of 6. China would receive a payoff of 10 and the U.S. 10. Hence W4
is the only Nash-equilibrium outcome.
Analysis of Results
The Nash-equilibrium, W4, is when Taiwan offers to unite with
China in a commonwealth and China decides not to invade or sanction.
The U.S. would not be drawn in. Invasion is an empty threat because the
U.S. will credibly defend Taiwan so long as Taiwan does not declare independence. This analysis reveals that economic blackmail will also be, in all
cases discllssed, an empty threat. While Han's model shows that the
prospect of American intervention will heighten the likelihood of conflict,
this model demonstrates that if compromise solutions are offered, war can
be averted. The compromises available to Taiwan and China are a commonwealth and a confederacy. With sovereignty being Taiwan's main
quest, and territorial integrity China's, these compromise regimes allow
both enrities to make gains from the status quo in their pursuits. Comparing the two regimes, a commonwealth gives Taiwan more sovereignty and
China less integrity. But a commonwealth is the more likely outcome because when China is offered either regime, the costs of invasion outweigh
the benefits. The absence of an invasion permits Taiwan to choose between the commonwealth and confederacy. It will choose a commonwealth because this regime type allows for greater sovereignty. The threat
of economic sanctions is also empty; China itself would lose economically
when it does not have to, and Taiwan would rather lose economically than
lose sovereignty. In this model, China would prefer to impose sanctions
rather than not if Taiwan declares independence. But in that case China
would be bener off attacking Taiwan anyway. From this I conclude that in
this crisis, economic blackmail would be an empty threat.
Conclusion
Previous game-theoretic works on the cross-strait crisis give Taiwan
and China two strategies in each game. Taiwan can either declare independence or maintain the status quo, and China can either attack or allow
the status quo. These dichotomies ignore concrete compromises between
independence and unification that scholars have proposed. This model
SICl'dA
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accounts for those compromises: it predicts that Taiwan will offer to form
a commonwealth with China, China will peacefully accept, and the
United States will not have to intervene. This model also reveals that Chinese threats of economic sanctions are not credible.
This finding has useful implications for further research. One possibility would be to merge this model with Benson and Niou's models to
form a more robust prediction, that is, construct a model that both includes uncertainty like that of Benson and Niou and accounts f<:)f the possihilities of the regime types examined in this model. Such a model would
show the impact of the crisis outcome for both American strategic commitments and regime-type possibilities.
Endnotes
1. Of course, reality is more complex. Eric Hyer has demonstrated that
the popular notion "China speaks with one voice on foreign policy" is false
(2005).
2. Daniel Damron has noted that rational choice is primarily concerned
with the aggregation of individual choices, not the individual choice itself
(200.~).

3. Some argue that having excessive commitments worldwide isrhe U.S.'s
problem; Buchanan notes that the U.S. has treaty guarantees to fifty countries and troops in one hundred countries (2004, 5-6).
4. The convention for extensive form games is to list a separate strategy
for every contingency (Cardon 2004; Mackay 2005). r;or example, China
would have !lV, - llvlsc, -llvl-sc for each strategy Taiwan chooses except r,
giving China a total of nine strategies. For simplicity and on the advice of
Jay Goodliffe I do not follow convention here (2005).
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